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Abstract
This study uses declassified data on US Mafia members of the 1950s and 1960s to
estimate the criminal network effect on their economic status. I measure economic
status exploiting detailed information about their place of residence.
Housing values are reconstructed using current deflated transactions data. I deal
with non-random sampling of mobsters modelling investigations on connections as
Markov chains. Reverse causality between economic status and the gangster’s po-
sition in the network is solved exploiting exogenous exposure to pre-immigration
connections. A standard deviation increase in closeness centrality increases eco-
nomic status by between one-forth and three-fourth of a standard deviation.
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In January 2011, exactly 50 years after Robert F. Kennedy’s first concentrated attack
on the American Mafia as the newly appointed attorney general of the United States,
nearly 125 people were arrested on federal charges, leading to what federal officials called
the “largest mob roundup in FBI history.”1
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Over the last 50 years the Mafia has continued following the same rules, and is still
active in many countries, including the United States.2 Despite this, the illicit nature of
organized crime activities has precluded empirical analysis and the literature has over-
whelmingly been anecdotal or theoretical (Reuter, 1994, Williams, 2001).
This study uses declassified data on 800 Mafia members, who were active just before
the 1961 crackdown, to study the importance of criminal connections inside such a secret
society (linking the network position of mobsters to an economic measure of their success).
The records are based on an exact facsimile of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)
secret files on American Mafia members in 1960 (MAF, 2007).3
The data contain information collected from FBN agents on the gangsters’ closest
criminal associates, which I use to reconstruct the criminal network.4 Connections are
believed to be the building blocks of secret societies and of organized crime groups,
including the Mafia. Francisco Costiglia, alias Frank Costello, a Mafia boss who according
to the data was connected to 34 gangsters, would say “he is connected” to describe
someone’s affiliation to the Mafia (Wolf and DiMona, 1974).
Indeed, the first rule in Mafia’s decalogue states that “No one can present himself
directly to another of our friends. There must be a third person to do it,” who knows
both affiliates (Maas, 1968).5 As a consequence, gangsters who are on average closer to all
the other gangsters need fewer interconnecting associates to expand their network. While
gangsters who bridge connections across separate clusters of the network can maintain
2According to the FBI, in 2005 there were 651 pending investigations related to the Italian-American
mafia; almost 1,500 mobsters were arrested, and 824 were convicted; of the roughly 1,000 “made”
members of Italian organized crime groups estimated to be active in the US, 200 were in jail (see
www.fbi.gov.
3The distribution of the year of first arrest of mobsters has almost full support within the range
1908-1960, so one can infer that the data refer to what the authorities knew in 1960.
4In the 1930s and up to the 1950s the FBN, which later merged with the Bureau of Drug Abuse
Control to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, was the main authority in the fight
against the Mafia (Critchley, 2009). For example, in New York the Federal Bureau of Investigation had
just four agents, mainly working in office, assigned to the mafia, while in the same office more than 400
agents were fighting domestic communists (Maas, 1968).
5These rules were listed both, in a 1963 testimony by the first FBN informant, Joe Valachi, and in a
piece of paper that belonged to the Italian Mafia boss Salvatore Lo Piccolo during his 2007 arrest.
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such monopoly power.
There are measures of importance of members inside networks that are based on the
average closeness and on the bridging capacity, called closeness centrality and betweenness
centrality.6 But even just the number of connections, known as degree centrality, might
be important to reach leadership positions, as in the Mafia these are not simply inherited.
Soldiers elect their bosses using secret ballots (Falcone and Padovani, 1991, pg. 101).7.
Three main empirical challenges emerge when estimating how a gangster’s network
centrality influences his economic prospects, called the network effect: i) the measurement
of economic prospects in the absence of information about illegal proceeds, ii) the non-
random and iii) endogenous nature of the network.
Regarding the first issue, since illicit transactions and criminal proceeds inside the
Mafia are unobservable, I use the value of the house or the apartment where such criminals
presumably resided (or nearby housing) to measure their economic success. Such value is
reconstructed based on the deflated value of the current selling price of their housing based
on the internet site Zillow.com. Prices are deflated using the Metropolitan Statistical
Areas’ (MSAs) average housing values from Gyourko et al. (2013). Given that most
mobsters who were active in 1960 were born from very poor families (see Lupo, 2009),
the value of the house where they resided, whether it was owned or rented, is arguably a
reasonable measure of their illegal proceeds,8 though reconstructing the original value is
certainly prone to error.9
6The closeness centrality index measures the average distance between a node (a member) and all
the other nodes, and its inverse is a good measure for how isolated members are. The betweenness
centrality index measures the number of times a node is on the shortest path between two randomly
chosen nodes. Ductor et al. (forthcoming) use both to predict research output of individual researchers.
Kinnan and Townsend (2012) look at how network distance to a bank affects consumption smoothing.
7Degree is often used to measure network importance. For example, Kremer and Miguel (2007)
use it study the diffusion of a deworming pill take-up, while Hochberg et al. (2007) show that venture
capitalists’ investment performance depends on how connected they are.
8A large literature has shown the link between housing demand and income (see Goodman, 1988).
The appendix Figure 11 shows a correlation of 60 percent between Zip code-level median housing prices
and median household income, with an elasticity that is very close to 1.
9Any classical measurement error would inflate the standard errors, making the inference more con-
servative.
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Regarding the second issue, in the 1960s the total estimated number of mafia members
was around 5,000 (Maas, 1968). Since almost all high-ranking members have a record, the
800 criminal profiles are clearly a potentially nonrepresentative sample of Mafia members.
To deal with the incompleteness and non-randomness of the network, in Section 1 I model
law enforcement’s surveillance and detection of Mafia network nodes (mobsters) as a
Markov chain (see also Mastrobuoni and Patacchini, 2012).
The final issue about the potential endogeneity of the network requires a longer dis-
cussion. Sparrow (1991) and Coles (2001) propose the use of network analysis to study
criminal networks, however, apart from some event studies based on a handful of connec-
tions, empirical evidence on criminal networks is scarce and never addresses the potential
endogeneity of the network.10
In non-experimental settings the variation that identifies the effect of networks may
be partly driven by homophily (the tendency of individuals to be linked to others with
similar characteristics), or unobserved characteristics which determine someone’s position
in the network as well as his or her outcomes. Mobsters might, for example, use their
(unobserved) wealth to build connections and buy more expensive housing.
Since real networks can hardly be generated entirely through an intervention, there are
three ways to estimate (causal) network effects:11 i) modelling sequentially the network
formation and the network effects (see Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011), ii) experimenting
10Morselli (2003) analyses connections within a single New York based family (the Gambino family),
Krebs (2002) analyses connections among the September 2001 hijackers’ terrorist cells, Natarajan (2000,
2006) analyzes wiretap conversations among drug dealers, and McGloin (2005) analyzes the connections
among gang members in Newark (NJ). There is considerable more theoretical work. Most studies have
focused on a market structure view of organized crime, where the Mafia generates monopoly power in
legal (for a fee) and illegal markets. Among others, such a view is present in the collection of papers
in Fiorentini and Peltzman (1997), and in Reuter (1983), Abadinsky (1990), Gambetta (1996), and
Kumar and Skaperdas (2009). Only two theoretical papers have focused on the internal organisation
of organized crime groups. Garoupa (2007) looks at the optimal size of these organisations, while
Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008) look at the optimal internal structure (cells versus hierarchies).
11Alternatively, one can avoid making any causal claims. Ductor et al. (forthcoming) focus on predic-
tions, and show that researchers’ network centralities help to predict future research output.
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with networks,12 and iii) instrumenting the position in the network.13 14
Since connections, their number, as well as their quality, are potentially even more
important in a world without enforceable contracts, a world where secrecy, reputation,
and violence prevail, such bonds are even more likely to be endogenous.
Several factors might influence the decision to connect and do business with another
gangster. When gangsters expand their network they are trading off the increased risk of
whistleblowing with increased criminal proceeds (Bonanno, 1983). Criminal hierarchies,
kinships, complementarity and substitutability in criminal as well as non-criminal activ-
ities are just some of the factors that are likely to influence the gangster’s decision to
expand his network, and thus his network centrality.
Instead of modelling the entire network formation mechanism, I rely on an instrumen-
tal variable that influences mobsters’ centrality in the Mafia network. Such instrument
is based on information collected from the pre-immigration communities (as in Munshi,
2003), that the mobsters left several decades before I observe their network and their
housing wealth in 1960. The identification strategy is based on advantages in build-
ing connections that originate from the gangsters’ or from his ancestors’ place of origin
12Experimental studies on networks usually take the network as given and randomly assign in-
formation or other treatments to single network nodes (Alatas et al., 2012, Fafchamps et al., 2013,
Kremer and Miguel, 2007). While such experimental variation does not solve the endogeneity issue,
Banerjee et al. (2013) develop and test a model of information diffusion, validating such model based on
unexploited variation in the data (see also Blume et al., 2012).
13For example, Munshi (2003) uses rainfall in the origin-community as an instrument for the size of
the network at the destination (the United States). Mexican immigrants with larger networks in the US
face better labour conditions.
14The more commonly studied peer effects can be seen as specific network effects, where only di-
rect links are assumed to matter. Researchers have used this restriction to estimate how criminals’
behaviour depends on the behaviour of their peers (see Baker and Faulkner, 1993, Bayer et al., 2009,
Drago and Galbiati, 2012, Haynie, 2001, Patacchini and Zenou, 2008, Sarnecki, 1990, 2001, Sirakaya,
2006). An old and extensive literature in labour economics documents the importance of friends and
relatives in providing job referrals (Bayer et al., 2008, Glaeser et al., 1996, Montgomery, 1991). In re-
cent years the interest has shifted toward understanding not just peer influence, or the influence of direct
links, but how the whole architecture of a network, thus including indirect links, influences behaviour and
outcomes (Ballester et al., 2006, Goyal, 2007, Jackson, 2008, Vega-Redondo, 2007). Empirical evidence
on these “network effects” is scarce but growing (see, among others Alatas et al., 2012, Angelucci et al.,
2010, Banerjee et al., 2013, Hochberg et al., 2007, Kinnan and Townsend, 2012), with the main burden
being the endogeneity of the network (see Blume et al., 2012).
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(Italy). Conditional on the region of birth, a detailed description of their legal and illegal
activities, and other individual characteristics of the mobsters these innate connections
should not influence mobsters’ housing wealth in the United States (other than through
such connections).15 While this exclusion restriction remains untestable, I address po-
tential pitfalls; mainly endogenous migration driven by successful mobsters, and direct
effects of potential innate connections on housing values.
Several factors might have helped building more connections when the gangster’s
ancestors were concentrated in more traditional Mafia territories: i) increased trust that
spills over from known and reputable families,16 ii) easier punishments through left-behind
kinships, and iii) knowledge about the rules and traditions of the secret society (e.g.
“omerta`,” which is a vow of silence).
Absent detailed information on the communities of origin for all the members born in
the US, I use the informative content of surnames on the place of origin, more commonly
known as isonomy. Such measure of potential innate interactions predicts the gangster’s
individual number and quality of connections. Exploiting differences in isonomy between
Southern and Northern Italy, I perform falsification tests of the first stage regressions
which validate the instrument’s capability to proxy for the place of origin. The instrument
is weak, though I show that restricting the analysis to ever arrested gangsters (making
up 80 percent of the sample), for which surnames are arguably measured with greater
precision strengthens the instrument without changing the results.
When using the instrument a one standard deviation increase in network closeness
centrality (the inverse of the average network distance from all other gangsters) increases
housing value by three-forth of a standard deviation, with the p-values on the endogeneity
15See Section 2.4 for a thorough discussion about the instrument. Such instrument is also related to
the growing literature on trust and family values. Guiso et al. (2006) present an introduction to the
importance of culture, defined as “customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation,” on economic behaviour. The same applies to
criminal behaviour.
16Karlan et al. (2009) build and estimate a model of trust in social networks between a lender and a
borrower based on the collateral that is provided by their weakest links.
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tests being usually close to 10 percent. The results are similar for eigenvector centrality
(which is a function of the prestige of the connected members), while the results for
degree (the simple count of connections) and betweenness centrality (the bridging capacity
across different clusters of the network) tend to be weaker, but for different reasons. On
one hand, degree appears to be a crude measure of someone’s importance (the value of
connections is increasing in the rank of the gangster). On the other hand, gangsters with
high betweenness were more likely to be part of the Commissione, the governing body
of the Mafia. These members of the Mafia often kept a lower profile by living in more
humble housing, which unresolvably biases the corresponding results downward.
1. Sampling and Estimating Network effects
A quick look at record number one, Joe Bonanno (see the Online appendix Figure 10),
reveals the kind of information that will be used to link a mobster’s network central-
ity to his economic success. According to the FBN he was born on January 18, 1905
in Castellamare (Sicily), and resided in 1847 East Elm Street in Tucson (Arizona). He
had interests in three legal businesses: Grande Cheese Co., Fond du Lac (Wisconsin), Al-
liance Realty & Insurance (Tucson, Arizona), and Brunswick Laundry Service (Brooklyn,
New York), etc.. Finally, his closest criminal associates were Lucky Luciano, Francisco
Costiglia (Frank Costello), Giuseppe Profaci, Anthony Corallo, Thomas Lucchese, and
Carmine Galante.
I use i) the value of the house where mobsters reside to measure economic success
y (Section 2.1), ii) information on their associates to reconstruct the network G (Sec-
tion 2.2),17 iii) the informational content of surnames to build the instrumental variable
(Section 2.4).
17I construct the undirected network, meaning that i and j with at least one of the two records lists
the other surname among the associates.
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But before analysing networks, particularly when such networks are hidden, it is im-
portant to take into account that the observed network G represents a subset (subgraph)
of the entire network G, and not necessarily a random one.
More formally, the goal is to model an economic outcome y as a linear function of
network centrality c (abstracting for simplicity from other covariates),
y = α + c(G)β + ǫ, (1)
when the observed network G is a subset of G. In general the measurement error that
biases the estimate β̂ will not be classical. Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) show that
when c measures degree centrality, the network is exogenous, and the sampling is random
(with sampling rate ψ), plimβ̂ = β · ψ−1 · attenuation bias. The reason for the scaling
factor ψ−1 is that under random sampling the expectation of c(G) is approximately equal
to ψc(G).
However, the observed Mafia records are unlikely to represent a random sample of
mobsters. The 800 criminal files come from an exact facsimile of a Federal Bureau of
Narcotics report of which fifty copies were circulated within the Bureau starting in the
1950s. They come from more than 20 years of investigations, and several successful infil-
trations by undercover agents (McWilliams, 1990). The FBN data represent a snapshot of
what the authorities knew in 1960, and thus do not contain exact information about the
hierarchies within the organisation. Such information was revealed only a few years later,
when Joe Valachi, a Mafia associate, became the first FBN and later FBI informant.18
Joe Valachi’s testimony confirmed FBN’s view that the Mafia had a pyramidal struc-
ture with connections leading toward every single member.19 Indeed, the observed net-
18Jacobs and Gouldin (1999) provide a relatively short overview about law enforcement’s unprece-
dented attack on Italian organized crime families following Valachi’s hearings.
19Valachi revealed that the Cosa Nostra was made of approximately 25 Families. Cosa Nostra was
governed by a Commissione of 7-12 bosses, which also acted as the final arbiter on disputes between
Families. The remaining 10 to 15 families were smaller and not part of Cosa Nostra’s governing body.
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work is connected (or ergodic), meaning that from each node (gangster) one can reach
any other node. Moreover, it is a “small-world” network, as the average path length
between gangsters is just 3.7 steps.
Given the hierarchical structure of the Mafia and the estimated 5,000 associates who
were active during those years, the 800 gangsters are likely to be a non-random sample
of Cosa Nostra members. More active, more important, and more connected mobsters
were certainly more likely to be noticed and tracked. Indeed, all known Mafia bosses who
were alive in 1960 are listed in the records.
This means that the observed 800 gangsters are likely to be more connected than the
average one, and that part of the network is unobserved. There are no written records
about how the FBN followed mobsters and constructed the network. Through surveil-
lance posts and undercover agents, the agency was likely discovering previously unknown
mobsters following known ones. Two surveillance photographs of Italian mobsters taken
in 1980 and in 1988 show evidence of these patterns (see the Online Appendix Figure
9). As a consequence more connected gangsters were more likely to be “sampled” by
the FBN. In order to produce a representative sample of mobsters, “sampling” weights
should underweigh highly connected mobsters and vice versa.
This kind of sampling resembles a procedure that is used to sample hidden popu-
lations, called snowball sampling (see Frank, 1979, Goodman, 1961, Granovetter, 1976,
Rothenberg, 1995, Snijders, 1992). Let us assume the FBN starts observing one or more
mobsters out of N , and that such known mobsters are indicated with the number one in
the 1 × N vector of zeros and ones p0, called the seed. Following the initial mobsters’
links the FBN will observe more and more mobsters. Starting with the N×N symmetric
matrix A = [aij ] with elements equal to 1 when mobsters i and j are connected and
zero otherwise (called the adjacency matrix ), one can obtain the transition matrix T
Each Family was structured in hierarchies with a boss (Capo Famiglia) at the top, a second in command,
called underboss (Sottocapo), a counselor (Consigliere) and several captains (Caporegime) who head a
group of soldiers (regime) (Maas, 1968).
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normalising the columns to sum up to one. The element tij of T measures the likelihood
of discovering mobster j when mobster i is under surveillance.
After k steps the likelihood of discovering mobster j is equal to the j-th of the vector
pk = p0T
k. The corresponding stationary distribution p, defined as a vector that does
not change under application of the transition matrix, is independent of the seed, and is
equal to p = pT.20
Element pi of the probability vector p can be interpreted as the likelihood of observing
gangster i if one randomly picked and followed an edge of the network. The resampling
weights are thus equal to the inverse of such probability wi =
1
pi
, with 0 < pi < 1. Since
pi is almost proportional to the number of connections, such weights are quite intuitive.
Gangsters with fewer connections, who are less likely to be spotted by the FBN and
as a result are under-represented, receive larger weights. The weighting corrects for the
selection bias when describing the individual characteristics of the mobsters.21
Moreover, using a Monte Carlo simulation, Lee et al. (2006) show that under snow-
ball sampling the scale bias is less than ψ−1 as for the most central nodes c(G) and c(G)
coincide.22 Since exact re-scaling would only be applicable to degree, later I use logarith-
mic transformations of c to address the scaling bias ψ−1 and an instrumental variable
approach to address the attenuation bias (as well as to address the potential endogeneity
of the network).
Expressing the variables of equation 1 in logs has several advantages. First, we will
see that the densities of log(y) and log(c) are approximately normal. Second, it deals
20The Perron-Frobenius theorem ensures that when the Markov chain is ergodic such a vector exists
and is unique. I approximate p with p40, and compute such distribution multiplying a constant vector
of size N (number of nodes) that sums up to one by the 40th power of T. This result is related to the
convergence in snowball sampling, called respondent-driven-sampling (Heckathorn, 1997).
21See Golub and Jackson (2010) for a discussion about selection bias in networks.
22Such bias would be even less severe under respondent-driven sampling.
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with the scaling bias. The (weighted) regression model in logs becomes:
log(y) = α˜ + log(c(G))β˜ + ǫ˜, (2)
where α˜ includes − log(ψ).
The summary statistics (Table 1) describe the individual characteristics as well as the
network characteristics of the gangsters, with and without correcting for the non-random
sampling design. The average number of identical surnames (possibly “extended family
members”) are about 1.5. Most gangsters migrated between the turn of the century and
the 1930s (see the Online Section A), though the records contain no information on when
the gangsters, or their families, migrated to the US. About 70 percent of mobsters who
were active in 1960 were born in the US, while the rest was split between Sicily (about
20 percent) and the rest of Italy (about 10 percent). In 1960 the average age of the
associates is about 48, and 76 percent of them are married (10 percent are divorced).
About 15 percent of the times the wife’s maiden name is shared with other gangsters,
leading to a presumably “connected wife”. The average number of known children is
about 1, while the average number of known siblings is 2. The FBN records contain also
some information about the mobsters’ legal and illegal businesses. The average number
of businesses is about 1. A little more than half of them are involved in drug dealing,
but in line with long criminal careers (the average age at first arrest is 23) the average
number of crime types listed in their records is close to 3. Only 14 percent of gangsters
have no arrest record. For these gangsters some variables (e.g. the place of residence, or
the exact surname) might be measured with more noise.
Weighting introduces larger changes in average centrality. For instance, the average
degree drops from about 11 to about 6 when weighting. The remaining centrality indices
are divided by their maximum value (multiplied by 100). The housing characteristics and




2.1 Housing values and Number of Legal Businesses
There is no database on individual housing values of 1960 properties,23 but feeding the
exact residence address into Zillow.com produces 641 current real estate values, and for
561 homes (about 90 percent of the sample) there is also information on the year the
house was built.24 The remaining 159 mobsters were not residing in the US anymore
(like Lucky Luciano, who had already been expelled from the country), or never lived in
the US (most of these mobsters were living in Italy).25
Zillow ’s estimated price is calculated from public data and from data submitted by
users (e.g. real estate agents or appraisers physically inspects the home and take special
features, location, and market conditions into account). Comparing historic estimates
based on Zillow with the actual transaction prices of homes that sold, about 80 to 90
percent of the time the measurement error is within 20 percent of the sale price (more
than half of the time it is within 10 percent).26
In order to deflate contemporary housing values to 1960 ones, I use the average housing
value in 1960 and in 2000 taken from Gyourko et al. (2013) for the 608 homes that are
in a MSA, while I use State level Census data for the remaining 33 homes.27
23The only historical data on individual housing units that goes so far back in time are rental prices and
sale prices from newspaper articles (see, for example, Margo (1996)), but it would be close to impossible
to find those exact same housing units occupied by the mobsters.
24One third of the times the exact address did not produce an estimated value, and the nearest house
with such information was selected. Since housing values tend to be highly geographically clustered such
proxy is likely to reduces the precision of our estimates by a small amount.
25While these mobsters do not contribute directly to the analysis, they are part of the network and




The left Panel of Figure 1 shows the relationship (truncated at the 90th percentile)
between the current and the 1960 values. Housing prices have approximately doubled
over the last 50 years, though they have increased almost 5 times in San Francisco, while
they stayed almost constant in Binghampton, Utica/Rome, or Buffalo. In the New York
MSA, where almost 300 gangsters reside, prices doubled.
The 5th, 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of the housing value in 1960
were 39, 50, 95, 190, 325, and 662 thousand dollars. The 95th and 99th percentiles were
1.5 and 4.7 million dollars. The right Panel of Figure 1 shows the housing value density
(truncated at the 90th percentile). The mean housing value in 1960 is $400,000 when not
weighting the sample, and is smaller ($379,000) when weighting.28
As long as the remaining within-city variation is stable between 1960 and today, the
deflated housing prices represent a good approximation of the gangsters’ economic sta-
tus. Unfortunately there is little empirical literature about the persistence in housing
prices within cities over decades. A recent study (Villarreal, 2013) shows that natu-
ral drainage conditions influenced the desirability of the local environment during the
settlement of New York City in the nineteenth century, and that, despite private residen-
tial redevelopment, those historical conditions explain contemporary variation in housing
prices and household incomes.29 Zillow.com publishes more than 10,000 zip code-level
median housing prices going back 16 years. Using such data to compute the correlation
between current (T ) and lagged (T − t) prices, one can show that as t goes to 16 years the
correlation declines from 100 to 92 percent.30 Moreover, deflating prices using city-level
inflation rates the decline drops from 8 to just 2 percentage points. That said, the corre-
lation might decrease (and the measurement error increase) when moving from median
prices to prices of individual housing units, and when reducing t for the remaining 38
28Table 1 shows that 10 percent of the houses found on Zillow.com were built after 1960. To control
for the fact that these houses might have a different valuation I am going to control for a dummy variable
equal to one when the houses were built after 1960.
29Bleakley and Lin (2012) show persistence across cities driven by now obsolete portage locations.
30See the Online appendix Figure 12.
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years.
The construction of housing value is also subject to additional problems. Wealthy
mobsters might own several houses and their place of residence might not perfectly rep-
resent their wealth whenever it is in the hands of figureheads.31 All these measurement
problems render the results more conservative.
Later in the network effects regressions I also control for the legitimate earnings op-
portunities, measured by the number of legal business that gangsters own.
2.2 Network-based Measures of Importance
Each criminal record contains a list of criminal associates. Figure 10 indicates, for exam-
ple, that Joe Bonanno was associated with Luciano, Costello, Profaci, Corallo, Lucchese,
and Galante. There is no evidence about how the FBN established such associations, but
each record tends to list the most important (and connected) associates.
Indirected connections are clearly more numerous, as mobsters can be listed as asso-
ciates in several records. As in Mastrobuoni and Patacchini (2012), I define two mobsters
to be connected whenever the FBN lists one of the two mobsters as an associate in the
other mobster’s file. Outdegree (the number of associates listed in one file) is bounded
by the available space on a record (the maximum is 13), while indegree (the number of
times someone is listed in other records) is not. For this reason degree (the number of
undirected connections) is only weakly correlated with outdegree (37 percent), and mainly
depends on indegree.32
The number of connections is clearly the simplest but crudest way to measure the
importance of members. In recent years social network theorists proposed different cen-
trality measures to account for the importance of someone’s connections (Borgatti, 2003,
31Joe Bonnano is a good example. While being a NYC boss his official residence was for strategic
reasons in Tucson, Arizona.
32In other words, I construct a symmetric adjacency matrix of indirected connections between mobsters’
last names. Dealing with changing first names would have been a complex task.
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Wasserman and Faust, 1994).33
Unlike degree, which weights every contact equally, the eigenvector index weighs con-
tacts according to their centralities.34 The index takes the whole network into account
(direct and indirect connections).35
Given the first Mafia rule that guarantees secrecy, gangsters who are closer to other
gangsters need fewer interlinking associates to reach a randomly chosen gangster, while
gangsters with important bridging capacities across clusters of the network have more
monopoly power in establishing such new links. While degree centrality might in principle
be inferior to the other centrality measures, I will estimate network effects based on all
four measures of centrality.
All these measures are positively skewed (Figure 2), especially betweenness centrality,
indicating that a few mobsters represent the bridges between subsets of the network.
Given the skewness and the scaling bias that I discussed prior to Equation 2 in or-
der to estimate the network effects all measures of network centrality are taken in logs
(Ductor et al., forthcoming, also use a specification in logs).36 The corresponding (more
symmetric) densities are plotted in the Online appendix Figure 13. Another Online ap-
pendix Figure shows that all centrality measures are positively related to each other
(Figure 14). Plotting log eigenvector against log closeness generates a thick line (ρ = 96
percent), which shows that once one penalises the larger outliers the two centrality mea-
sures are quite similar.
But such large correlation masks a very different variability. The ratio between the
33See also Sparrow (1991) for a discussion on centrality indices in criminal networks.
34It equals the eigenvector of the largest positive eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix, the N×N matrix
of zeros and ones (indicating whether gangster i and j are connected).
35As first noted by Granovetter (1973), weak ties (i.e. friends of friends) are important source of infor-
mation. While Ballester et al. (2006, 2010) show that in non-cooperative games the activity of individuals
is proportional to the eigenvector centrality (the “key-player” having the largest eigenvector centrality),
several assumptions of that model would not hold for the Mafia: conditional on operating inside the
same area and being part of the same Mafia “Family,” the hierarchy (introducing cooperativeness) as
well the implied risk such connections are likely to influence the activity of mobsters.
36For the betweenness centrality index, since 4.5 percent of observations have such index equal to zero,
I take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation log(y + (y2 + 1)1/2).
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standard deviation of the log eigenvector index and the log closeness index is about 10
to 1. This has to be taken into account when interpreting standardised variations.
The correlations are lower with respect to the other two measures, especially in the
lower tail. For betweenness the low correlation is driven by the fact that several mobsters,
despite having many connections, have extremely low levels of betweenness. Hierarchies
are the likely reason. For about 400 mobsters I managed to reconstruct their position
within the mafia (not always referred to their status in 1960). Underbosses and captains
who head several soldiers within one Mafia “Family,” tend to have large degrees but
low betweenness. Counsellors and bosses have the largest median betweenness measure
(about 1/2), while those of captains and underbosses are half that large.37 Differences in
closeness and eigenvector centrality across ranks are less striking. With respect to degree
the low correlation with other indices is driven by small values. At larger degrees most
indices tend to be highly correlated with each other.
The next section describes the relationship between housing prices and network cen-
trality.
2.3 Economic Status, Network Centrality, and Potential Bi-
ases
Figure 3 shows that the unconditional weighted local polynomial regression of log-housing
value is increasing in all log-centrality measures, and is not far from being linear. The
correlation is stronger when using the eigenvector index and the closeness index, than
when using the simple degree or the betweenness index (approximately, 20 percent versus
10 percent).
On the one hand, degree is likely to be a poor measure of centrality when the con-
nections are scarce but valuable. On the other hand, mobsters with larger betweenness
37Soldiers have a median betweenness index of about 0.18.
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indices, represent bridges between clusters of the network, most likely different Mafia
Families. Since the detection of a such high ranking bosses would have put the whole
organisation in peril (see Baccara and Bar-Isaac, 2008), there is anecdotal evidence that
some bosses kept a low profile. For example, Joseph Bonanno tells the story about when
he decided not to join Lucky Luciano’s very lucrative garment industry in New York to
avoid being in the spotlights (Bonanno, 1983). Such members’ true economic outcomes
might also be hidden whenever their wealth is in the hands of figureheads.
There is indeed evidence that some Mafia leaders preferred to “officially” reside in
unpretentious housing. Using the FBN’s description of the associates, one can show that
those described as “leaders” or “bosses” tend to be more central in the network (Table 2).
They tend to have considerably larger betweenness centrality than lower-ranked gangster,
about 40 percent larger, while other centrality measures differ less between bosses and
lower-ranked gangsters. Despite this, such leaders tend to live in less expensive housing.38
Moreover, the Sicilian origin seems to influence the decision to keep a lower profile.39
Figure 4 shows that despite the fact that Sicilians are usually more centrally located in
the Mafia network, they tend to live in considerably cheaper housing; especially at the
top of the distribution of housing values. Later in Section 3 I will test the robustness of
the network effect when controlling for the place of origin.
Other potential omitted variables when regressing housing values on network cen-
trality are the family composition and the gangsters’ initial wealth. Larger families are
instrumental to the bosses’ success, but need also larger and more expensive housing.
Wealth might be used to buy both, power inside the mafia and more expensive hous-
ing. While the data have no good proxy for initial wealth, in the next section I devise a
38Bosses also show an aversion to drug dealing, a very lucrative business. Later we will see that
gangsters involved in drug dealing live is houses that are about 30 percent more expensive.
39Recently arrested bosses who were heading the entire Sicilian mafia, Toto` Riina and Bernardo Proven-
zano, were living in very poor houses. Such cautious behaviour seems less present in other organized
crime groups. A recently arrested boss from the Neapolitan Camorra, Francesco Schiavone, was living
in a mansion, built after the house in the Hollywood movie “Scarface.” This same pattern between the
Italian region of birth and housing values is evident in the data.
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presumably exogenous instrument that is based on the innate potential connection back
in Italy. In particular, I exploit the joint spatial distribution of the gangsters’ surnames
in Italy to construct a measure of inherited (potential) connections, which is moderately
correlated with network centrality.
2.4 Birthplace and Potential Innate Interactions
Several authors have highlighted the importance of familial, interpersonal, and communal
relationships in determining criminals’ success inside organized crime groups (see, among
others, Coles, 2001, Falcone and Padovani, 1991, Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972). Most
of these relationships are also likely to influence housing decisions and would lead to
implausible exclusion restrictions. For example, marrying a gangster’s daughter is likely
to boost someone’s power inside the mafia, but might also change someone’s housing
budget directly.
Ideally, one would use mobsters’ innate characteristics which influence his future
chances to build connections, but are unrelated to his housing choice (other than through
the derived centrality in the network). Proximity to other mobsters represents a natural
choice. But such proximity should not be related to inherited wealth, as wealth might
be used to acquire centrality. Moreover, geographic proximity based on the place of US
residence is likely to be endogenous with respect to network centrality, as more powerful
mobsters might decide to live in the middle of their sphere of influence.
For these reasons I use a measure of proximity that is based on Italian and not US
residencies. Mafia associates born in Italy,40 but also those born in the US from Italian
immigrants often kept strong links with the Italian communities of origin.41 At the be-
40About a quarter of mobsters were born in Sicily, 2/3 were born outside of Italy (mostly in the US)
and the rest in other regions of Italy. Properly weighting the data, these fractions are 2/10, 7/10, and
1/10, indicating that Sicilians tend to have more connections.
41Table 1 shows that the average age is 48 years, which means that the average year of birth is 1912,
right in the middle of the Italian migration wave (see the Online Section A). Most mobsters are either
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ginning of this study, I already listed a number of reasons why such innate connections
might influence the gangsters’ connections back in the US (reputation, trust, punishabil-
ity, and knowledge of the rules). The main untestable identification assumption is that
such interactions at the origin do not shape the gangsters’ housing preferences, at least
not conditional on other covariates (including the region of birth).
The records do not contain pre-immigration information on the exact place of origin
in Italy, but one can approximate such information using the informative content of
surnames. For at least 30 years researchers in human biology have been exploiting the
analogy between patrilineal surname transmission and the characterisation of families
and communities (Lasker, 1977). For geographic, historical, as well as social reasons,
surnames tend to be highly geographically clustered, particularly in countries with low
internal mobility like Italy (see Allesina, 2011, Barrai et al., 1999, Zei et al., 1993).42.
The geographic distribution of surnames, called isonomy, contains a strong signal about
someone’s origin.43 The surname of record number 1, “Bonanno”, is more widespread
across the whole country, though, again, most Bonanno families live in Sicily, and a non-
negligible fraction lives in Castellamare del Golfo, which is where Bonanno’s family was
coming from.44
Given that i) 30 percent of gangsters were born in Italy (including Sicily) and later
moved to the US and even those who were born in the US were likely to keep links
with Italy, and ii) surnames tend to be geographically clustered, the way the current
distribution of a given surname overlaps with the distribution of all the other surnames
represents one way, possibly the only way, to measure the connections stemming from
first or second generation immigrants. All but a handful of mobsters were of Italian origin, as this was a
prerequisite to become a member. The few non-Italian gangsters in the data were either French gangsters
from Marseille or Corsica, or part of the, so-called, Jewish Mafia.
42See Colantonio et al. (2003) for an overview on recent developments on the use of surnames in human
population biology.
43One can try out surnames of Italian economists on the following Web sites: http://www.gens.info/
or http://www.paginebianche.it/.
44Guglielmino et al. (1991) show that in Sicily genetic and cultural transmission are revealed by sur-
names.
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the gangsters’ origin country (thus unrelated to US housing prices).
Since poor living conditions in Italy were the main driver to migrate to the US, such
innate connections are hardly measuring innate wealth. Conditional on the region of birth
and on all the other individual characteristics of the mobsters they are also unlikely to
be related to individual preferences for housing. Since some of the mobsters might have
migrated as a response to increased wealth levels by the potential innate connections
(violating the exclusion restriction between potential innate connections and housing
wealth), later in the robustness regressions I will control for the place of origin of the
gangsters’ direct associates (direct links).
Figure 5 visualises how I construct the index. Starting from the current zip code level
distribution of the members’ surnames,45 I compute the probability that each members’
surname shares a randomly chosen zip code located in Italy (as a robustness check I
also limit the attention to the South) with other surnames from the list.46 To be more
precise, the index for member i is equal to 1,000,000 times the sum across zip codes j of
the fraction of surnames of member i present in zip codes j times the fraction of surnames
of the other members (−i) in the same zip code:










There are 4,748 zip codes for about 60 million Italians, thus each zip code covers a
little more than 12,000 Italians, and an area of about 23 square miles, a reasonable area
within which most relationships are likely to get established. In Figure 5 each circle is
proportional to the number of surnames present within each zip code. Not surprisingly
many surnames show up in Sicily, in Naples, and in Calabria. Many of these surnames
45Only four mobsters were neither born in Italy nor in the US. For two of these mobsters (Lansky and
Genese) the Potential Innate Interactions index is zero.
46I use Italy’s phone directory http://www.paginebianche.it/ in 2010. Ideally one would use the
distribution of surnames in 1960, though previous research has shown how persistent such distribution
is (Colantonio et al., 2003).
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appear also in large cities that were subject to immigratory flows from the south, like
Milan, Rome, and Turin. Such migration patterns introduce some noise in the instrument,
which is why later I also compute a Potential Innate Interactions measure that is just
based on Southern regions (Campania, Molise, Calabria, Basilicata, Sicilia, Sardegna,
Puglia), with Northern regions acting as imperfect falsification samples (as migration
might depend on ethnic networks).
The Potential innate interactions index tends to be small when the fraction of sur-
names i overlaps little with the fraction of all other surnames −i. Dividing by the total
number of surnames (i and −i) takes into account that some surnames are more frequent
than others.
The average index is equal to 36 per one million, though taking the sampling into
account it drops to 26, already indicating that more connected mobsters have more in-
teractions (see Table 1). About ten percent of the times the index is zero, either because
the zip codes do not overlap or because the surname is not in the phone directory.47
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the interaction index. Mobsters born in Italy tend
to have more innate potential interactions than those born outside of Italy (Figure 7).
Most mobsters with very large interactions were born in the Western part of Sicily (the
10 cities of birth corresponding to the largest interaction indices are in major US cities
(Chicago, NYC, St. Luis), but also Palermo (Sicily), Cerda (Sicily), Trapani (Sicily),
Amantea (Calabria). Most of these are well-known mafia enclaves.
When measuring the interactions focussing on zip codes in Southern Italy the shape
of the bars is very similar, while when focussing on zip codes in Central and Northern
Italy the interaction probabilities are considerably lower, and are lowest among Sicilians,
which is consistent with the index capturing interactions in the place of origin. Since
Northern interactions are likely to be the product of recent migrations from the South to
47In the regressions I allow the zeros to have an independent effect. Moreover, ideally one would us
the mother’s surname as well, though such information is not always available.
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the North of Italy rather than true potential connections in 1960 they represent a useful
placebo case.48
Potential interactions influence the centrality measures (see Figure 8 and Table 3).
Correlations are between 15 (eigenvector, closeness, and degree) and 30 percent (between-
ness), indicating that such initial interactions are important, though neither necessary,
nor sufficient, to reach the top positions in the organisation (those positions that generate
bridges across Families). Moreover, the correlation is larger when restricting the inter-
actions to Southern Italy and considerably weaker when restricting the interactions to
Northern Italy. For this reason, in most two-stage regressions I will use the interactions
based on Southern regions as instruments.
The next Section assigns confidence intervals to the unconditional network effects
shown in Figure 3, and adds further controls and an IV strategy to pinpoint such effects.
3. Regression Results
3.1 Evidence based on Ordinary Least Squares regressions
When estimating Eq. 2 using closeness centrality by ordinary least squared, I find that
doubling the centrality measure increases housing values by about 200 percent (Table
4).49 Such large elasticities are driven by a very compressed distribution of closeness
centrality. In terms of standard deviations (SDs), a SD increase in log closeness (0.12)
48Pull factors of migration that are driven by social networks would preserve some of the original
predictive power.
49Given that there is one large network, the residuals might be correlated across mobsters. Assuming
that such correlation depends on the shortest distance between pairs of gangsters the variance of the
residual of gangster i is going to be a function of the sum of all such distances dij over j. In particular,
σi =
∑
j σij(dij). Approximating such variance with either a linear function or an exponential function
in average distances (the inverse of closeness) one always rejects that distance influences the squared
residuals, and thus the correlations across mobsters (see appendix Table 9). Nevertheless, in all regres-
sions the standard errors are clustered at the surname level, which is the level at which the centrality
measures are calculated.
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increases housing values by one quarter.
The first Column controls only for variables collected from Zillow.com, in particular
whether the housing unit has been built after 1960 (the year of the FBN records) and
whether such information is available. The negative coefficient on this variable is captur-
ing that for more expensive housing Zillow.com is more likely to collect information on the
year the house was built. Controlling for additional variables (Column 2) increases some-
how the effect, while adding US State of residence fixed effects reduces them (Column
3); partly because the more influential mobsters resided in New York and New Jersey
(where housing prices tend to be high).50 Given that the State of residence measures
part of the centrality of mobsters in the remainder of the study I will not control for it.
The instrument used in Section 3.2 is by construction unrelated to the State of residence
(other than through connections). I will also show that the results change little when
controlling for the log state-level average housing price (thus de facto using the log of
relative housing prices).
The last two columns show that similar results are found when using closeness in
levels rather than in logs, though in such case the predictive power of centrality drops
slightly (in line with the scaling bias). As for the log, a standard deviation increase in
closeness centrality (equal to 8.27) increases housing values by about one quarter.
Before showing the results for other centrality measures, let me briefly discuss the
coefficients on the other regressors. Gangsters born in Italy, in particular those born
in Sicily tend to live in cheaper housing, which might either be due to housing prefer-
ences or to a more pronounced avoidance to attract attention (though the effects are not
significantly different from 0).51 Age at first arrest, which might represent a (negative)
measure of career experience within the organisation tends to be negatively related to
housing values, meaning that earlier arrests tend to be related to increased housing val-
50Measurement error might also be co-responsible for such drop.
51Appendix Table 10 shows that the place of birth, while influencing the housing value, does not
introduce heterogeneity in the effect of centrality.
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ues. Not just experience, but also being involved with drug dealing seems to be related
to higher housing values, though the coefficient stops being significant once state of resi-
dence effects are added to the regression (indicating that the drug dealing business used
to be geographically clustered). The number of legal businesses tend to be positively
associated with housing values, which is not surprising.
Going back to the centrality measures, in Table 5 I substitute closeness centrality with
the other measures, with and without controlling for additional regressors. A quick look
at the R-squared reveals that closeness centrality is the strongest predictor of housing
value. This is coherent with the first rule of the Mafia, which states that only interlinking
affiliates, for example B in a network A-B-C, have the power to introduce a direct link
between A and B. Mobsters who are on average closer to all other mobsters will thus
need fewer interlinking associates to establish new connections. Eigenvector centrality
has similar predictive power, which is not surprising given how strongly correlated the
two measures are.52
The coefficient on degree, instead, has relatively larger standard errors, and a standard
deviation increase in log degree increases housing value by about 11 percent; in line with
what emerged in Figure 3, the flattest relationship is the one between log housing value
and log betweenness centrality. Statistically speaking, the slope is 0.53
This is likely driven by the bosses’ preference for keeping a low profile and, as argued
before, such bias cannot be eliminated.
52The elasticity is larger for closeness centrality only because its variation is about 10 times smaller
than the one of eigenvector centrality. One standard deviation increase in log-closeness centrality has
about the same impact on housing value as a one standard deviation increase in log eigenvector centrality.
53All the regressions use the weighting strategy developed earlier on, but the results based on un-
weighted regressions can be seen in the Online appendix Table 11.
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3.2 Evidence based on Instrumental Variable regressions
As previously discussed, for a number of reasons (including measurement error) OLS
coefficients on centrality measures might be inconsistent. Table 6 presents the first stage
(sketched in Figure 8) and the main regressions in a compact form, focussing on the
instruments and on the endogenous variable.54
Having no potential innate connections is allowed to have its own influence on central-
ity. All centrality measures are positively correlated with the potential connections, but
the coefficient is more significant for closeness and betweenness centralities, though the
instrument is not very strong. In particular, for closeness centrality the F-statistic for the
excluded instruments is around 3.5 when considering the joint significance of interactions
and zero interactions (otherwise it is close to 5). The F-statistic is largest and above
10 for the betweenness index. While there are no Montecarlo simulations to determine
the bias for clustered standard errors, we should take into account that the estimates
are likely to be biased toward OLS. Later I will increase the strength of the instrument
by focussing on the 86 percent of gangsters who have been arrested at least once, and
for whom all variables are more likely to be measured with precision. But test statistics
related to the reduced form regressions, which do not suffer from weak-instrument bias
(the Anderson and Rubin p-value as well as the p-value on potential innate interactions
alone) tend to be below 10 percent, indicating that the instrument does indeed influence
housing values.
Instrumenting the centrality measures the coefficients on closeness, eigenvector, as
well as on degree centrality tend to be three times as large as the OLS equivalents,
meaning that a standard deviation increase in either closeness or eigenvector centrality
almost doubles the housing value. Such differences are likely to be partly explained by
measurement error bias, while there is little evidence that the weakness of the instrument
54Appendix Tables 12 and 13 show all the coefficients.
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is driving these differences. As in the OLS case, betweenness does not appear to be
significantly different from 0, confirming that the gangsters with large bridging capacity
tend to keep a lower profile, no matter whether the centrality has been reached exploiting
potential innate connections or not. Overall the relative precision of the estimates tends
to be smaller than for the OLS regressions, which is in part due to the instrument’s
weakness. Indeed, the standard errors are large, and endogeneity test p-values fluctuate
around 10 percent.
Table 7 improves upon the previous results by focussing on samples where variables
are measured with greater care. Surnames, which represent the core information for the
instrumental variable strategy, are not easily measured inside the Mafia. For secrecy
reasons gangsters are typically known by their nickname. This is why the FBN was also
collecting the gangsters’ aliases.55 Knowing the exact name is clearly important to recon-
struct its geographical distribution in Italy, and for arrested gangsters such information
the FBN could be double-checked. Column 1 shows the baseline results. In Column
2 I restrict the analysis to gangsters who have at least one arrest record. These rep-
resent about 85 percent of the total, and are potentially a more selected sample. The
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic does indeed improve, and the IV coefficients increase
slightly.
Column 3 shows that the results do not change much when computing the poten-
tial interactions using all Italian regions, though the power of the instrument decreases
considerably.
Another sample for which the information might be more precise are the mobsters
born in the United States. Focussing on this group of criminals addresses also the concern
that innate connections might still have independent (direct) influence on current wealth,
55Some of the aliases for gangsters mentioned before were: Don Vitone, The Old Man (Vito Gen-
ovese); Francisco Castiglia, Frank Costello, Frank Saverio, Saveria (Francisco Costiglia); Joe Bananas,
Joe Bononno, Joe Bonnano, Joe Bouventre (Joseph Bonanno), Joe Proface (Giuseppe Profaci); Carlo
Gambrino, Carlo Gambrieno, Don Carlo (Carlo Gambino).
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as this should be less likely to happen for US born ones. The smaller sample reduces the
power of the instrument but the instrumental variable coefficient does not change much.
In Table 8 I perform a whole series of additional robustness checks, always keeping the
entire sample. The first Column adds the average log housing value at the MSA level to
control for the possibility that the results are simply due to sorting of the most influential
mobsters in cities that have the highest housing values. The network effect becomes just
a little smaller when controlling for such relative differences in housing prices (indicating
that centrality is positively correlated with average housing values).
Column 2 does not control for the number of legal businesses owned by the mobster,
which reduces slightly the coefficient. Column 3 deals again with the potential violations
of the exclusion restriction. Since some of the mobsters, with their surnames, might
have migrated as a response to increased wealth levels, I add the fraction of direct links
(associates) that were born in Sicily and in peninsular Italy to the regression. Doing so
leaves the results almost unchanged.
One could argue that even controlling for the sum of the types of crimes for which
the criminals have been arrested and for the sum of legal businesses that the gangster
owns, the exclusion restrictions might not hold whenever the potential innate interactions
not only influence the gangsters’ centrality but also additional remunerative abilities
that are not channelled through connections. While there is no definite test to exclude
such a possibility, in columns 4 and 5 I control for a series of dummies that describe
the gangster’s crimes, modus operandi, and legal jobs, and potentially control for such
unobserved remunerative ability. The potential downside is that adding these controls
might capture part of the network effect.
There are 13 crime categories with at least 3 percent of arrested gangsters (murder,
robbery, burglary, larceny, drug offence, prohibition offence, illegal detention of weapons,
menace, theft, assault, fraud, disorderly behaviour, and other crimes), 6 modus operandi
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that come from FBN descriptions of the gangster’s illegal activities (racketeering, drug
dealing, gambling, bookmaking, murder, and other), and finally 14 job descriptions with
at least 3 percent of mobsters involved (restaurant, drugstore, food industry, real estate,
transportation, hotel, import-export, automotive, clothing, manual labour, row materials,
amusement, casino, and others). While some of these dummy variables are correlated with
both the centrality of mobsters and the log housing value, the network effect changes little
when adding these controls and, if anything, becomes even larger.
Column 6 tests the robustness of the results when getting rid of the zero interaction
dummy (thus assuming continuity and linearity at 0) and allowing the instrument to
have non-linear effects on log closeness. The network effect because smaller but is still
significant at the 10 percent level. Finally, in the last two columns I add a variable that
is clearly endogenous, whether the mobster is married to a “connected” wife, meaning a
wife whose maiden name is also the surname of another mobster in the data.
These marriages tend to be arranged for strategic reasons, and allow gangsters to gain
additional power (connections) as well as wealth. Adding this variable increases the OLS
estimates while keeping the 2SLS estimate almost unchanged, suggesting that omitted
variables (which the instrument takes care of) are indeed biasing the OLS estimate toward
zero.56
Overall, no matter the specification a standard deviation increase in closeness centrality–
for instance, such difference would mean moving from a median closeness to the 90th
percentile–increases housing values by about 75 percent.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper estimates how, in 1960, network centrality inside the Italian-American Mafia
influenced gangsters’ economic prosperity, measured by the value of their homes. In the
56Given the potential endogeneity of such marriage one cannot draw more definite conclusions.
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overground world, the whole geometry of connections has been shown to be related to a
variety of economic outcomes. In the underground world such connections are presumably
even more important, and yet evidence on this has mainly been based on ethnographic
studies.
Moreover, even in the overground world researchers have rarely gone beyond just
documenting correlations, as networks tend to emerge endogenously out of complicated
bilateral and multilateral decision processes, and researchers often observe only subsets
of the entire network. I deal with the non-random sampling design modelling the law-
enforcement data collection process within the network as a Markov process.
With respect to the endogenous nature of networks, social scientists have been able
to exploit the geometry of the network to develop identification strategies for direct
connections (peer effects), but not yet for measures of how central agents are inside
networks. Instruments for networks with reasonable exclusion restrictions are in short
supply. Any characteristic that determines someone’s position inside his/her network is
also likely to directly influence a multitude of other outcomes. In the Mafia, for example,
family relationships, wealth, place of birth, etc. might help securing a centrality in the
network, but could also be related to the demand for housing.
For migrants with strong ethnic identities, instruments naturally evolve from shocks
that happen in the country of origin and are thus less likely to influence economic out-
comes in the country of destination. Munshi (2003) uses rainfall in Mexico to instrument
for the network size of Mexican immigrants to study how such size influences labour mar-
ket outcomes. Similarly, this paper instruments network centrality using the potential
exposure to connections in the gangster’s place of origin (30 to 50 years earlier). In the
absence of pre-immigration data, I use the informational content of surnames (isonomy)
to measure such place. Individual home values in 1960 are reconstructed starting from
today’s values.
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Notwithstanding the distant past and the approximation lead to weak instruments
and larger standard errors, the evidence suggests that centrality measures have a sizeable
influence on housing values. Mobsters who are on average closer to their peers tend to
live in more expensive housing. This is consistent with the importance of interconnection
capacity in a secret society where two unlinked mobsters need a common associate to
generate a new (direct) link.
But then, mobsters who act as bridges across clusters of the larger network57 tend
to keep a lower profile, and officially reside in less expensive housing (either because
they hide their true residence through the use of figureheads or because they really
prefer so). The evidence suggests that these tend to be the more important bosses,
those who most likely form the governing body of the Mafia (la Commissione). In line
with Bonnano’s autobiography such bosses were less likely to be directly involved in the
narcotics businesses, which might be part of the same “attention avoidance strategy”
(Bonanno, 1983).
The geometry of the network is likely to influence not just the economic prosperity
of the “made” men but also their criminal activity (and viceversa); and therefore the
overall crime rates.58 Understanding how network effects shape the portfolio of crimes
that gangsters commit represents a natural extension of this work.
Finally, while data restrictions prevent researchers from performing similar analyses
based on more recent organized crime networks, this might hopefully change in the near
future. Understanding how central figures grow up inside criminal networks is fundamen-
tal to the design of targeted law enforcement strategies.
Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Collegio Carlo
Alberto, Netspar, IZA; submitted August 2013, accepted July 2014.
57Given what is known about the Mafia these are Mafia Families, clans, or mandamenti.
58Mastrobuoni and Patacchini (2012) show that cities with larger Mafia densities (measured by the
average eigenvector index) exhibit larger violent crime rates.
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Fig. 1: Housing Value Deflators and Distribution
Notes: Current housing prices (2010) are taken from Zillow.com.
Deflators use MSA or State level housing values from the Census
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0 1 2 3
log Betweenness
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Notes: The size of the circles is proportional to the sampling weight.
The solid line corresponds to the local polynomial smoothing regression
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Unweighted Weighted
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Individual characteristics
Housing Value 1960 397,678 805,186 378,196 770,101 5,286 7,866,203
Potential innate interaction 36.18 76.79 26.10 51.59 0 654.02
Housing built after 1960 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35 0 1
Year built unknown 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0 1
Extended family members 1.58 1.01 1.30 0.73 1 6
Born outside Italy (mainly U.S.) 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.46 0 1
Born in Sicily 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40 0 1
Age 48.63 7.59 48.20 7.57 24 72
Year of birth unknown 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39 0 1
Height in feet 5.61 0.20 5.60 0.19 5 6.17
Weight in pounds 177.66 26.87 176.63 29.12 95 365
Age at first arrest 23.03 7.32 23.09 7.11 8 57
Never arrested 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0 1
Connected wife 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.36 0 1
Married 0.80 0.40 0.76 0.43 0 1
Divorced 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 0 1
Number of children 1.07 1.47 1.06 1.44 0 8
Siblings 2.10 2.14 2.02 2.08 0 11
Types of crime committed 2.64 1.68 2.71 1.75 0 9
Number of businesses 1.08 1.01 1.00 0.94 0 5
Involved in drug dealing 0.56 0.50 0.59 0.49 0 1
Network characteristics
Degree 11.10 9.28 6.21 5.52 1 71
Eigenvector (std.) 12.77 14.12 6.59 8.31 0.05 100
Betweenness (std.) 4.94 9.33 1.90 4.21 0 100
Closeness (std.) 75.12 8.76 69.78 8.27 50.51 100
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Table 2: Housing Values and Centralities by Leadership Status
Mafia leader (weighted) Mafia leader (unweighted)
No (91%) Yes (9%) No (87%) Yes (13%)
Housing value 380,453 362,479 399,654 387,587
Involved in drug dealing 0.62 0.39 0.58 0.45
Betweenness 1.76 2.86 4.26 8.46
Closeness 69.63 70.85 74.51 78.23
Eigenvector 6.21 9.26 11.54 19.03
Degree 5.94 8.10 10.25 15.46
Notes: About 13 percent of gangsters are described as either “leader” or “boss” in the FBN records.
Table 3: Correlation Table
log Clo. log Bet. log Eig. log Deg. Pot. Int. Pot. Int. South
log Betweenness 0.533
log Eigenvector 0.968 0.460
log Degree 0.801 0.646 0.806
Potential innate interactions 0.159 0.309 0.121 0.165
Pot. Int. in the South 0.185 0.345 0.148 0.191 0.959
Pot. Int. in the North 0.060 0.150 0.034 0.066 0.811 0.610
Notes: Clustered (by surname) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
44
Table 4: Housing Value Regressions and Closeness Centrality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log Housing value




Housing built after 1960 0.100 0.054 0.048 0.051 0.045
(0.156) (0.159) (0.157) (0.160) (0.158)
Year built unknown -0.346*** -0.277** -0.298** -0.276** -0.298**
(0.121) (0.122) (0.140) (0.122) (0.140)
Extended family members -0.216*** -0.067 -0.224*** -0.069
(0.073) (0.056) (0.074) (0.056)
Born outside Italy (mainly U.S.) -0.089 -0.038 -0.085 -0.035
(0.173) (0.160) (0.172) (0.160)
Born in Sicily -0.273 -0.173 -0.269 -0.169
(0.188) (0.161) (0.188) (0.161)
Age -0.065 -0.076 -0.063 -0.075
(0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075)
Age squared/100 0.067 0.082 0.065 0.081
(0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080)
Year of birth unknown -1.750 -1.935 -1.729 -1.920
(1.602) (1.663) (1.610) (1.664)
Height in feet 0.530* 0.224 0.536* 0.224
(0.297) (0.279) (0.299) (0.280)
Weight in pounds -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age at first arrest -0.013* -0.016*** -0.013* -0.016***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Never arrested -0.127 -0.181 -0.141 -0.188
(0.204) (0.183) (0.205) (0.183)
Married -0.080 -0.000 -0.083 -0.001
(0.151) (0.138) (0.151) (0.139)
Divorced -0.042 -0.005 -0.052 -0.010
(0.222) (0.184) (0.222) (0.184)
Number of children -0.030 -0.062** -0.031 -0.064**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
Siblings 0.016 -0.010 0.016 -0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Types of crime committed 0.021 -0.002 0.019 -0.003
(0.038) (0.034) (0.038) (0.034)
Number of businesses 0.043 0.092** 0.043 0.092**
(0.051) (0.043) (0.052) (0.043)
Involved in drug dealing 0.346*** 0.003 0.344*** -0.000
(0.099) (0.091) (0.099) (0.091)
State of residence fixed effects X X
Observations 641 641 637 641 637
R-squared 0.066 0.144 0.349 0.141 0.348
Notes: Clustered (by 530 surnames) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
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Table 5: Housing Value Regressions With Other Centrality Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log Housing Value
log Eigenvector 0.184*** 0.218***
(0.040) (0.043)
log Degree 0.148** 0.220***
(0.068) (0.083)
log Betweenness -0.085 0.036
(0.115) (0.158)
Other Xs X X X
Observations 641 641 641 641 641 641
R-squared 0.062 0.136 0.025 0.098 0.014 0.076
Notes: All regressions control for the housing variables. The additional regressors (“Other
Xs”) are the same as in Table 4. Clustered (by 530 surnames) standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: First stage regression log Closeness log Eigenvector log Degree log Betweennes
Potential innate interactions (in %) 0.033** 0.268* 0.116 0.138***
(0.015) (0.158) (0.094) (0.053)
Zero potential innate interactions -0.019 -0.308 -0.236 0.011
(0.020) (0.234) (0.153) (0.032)
R-squared 0.160 0.146 0.205 0.326
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 3.479 2.663 2.343 12.60
F-stat on potential innate interactions 5.208 2.887 1.523 6.726









Observations 641 641 641 641
Endogeneity p-value 0.305 0.214 0.146 0.244
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 3.479 2.663 2.343 3.399
Anderson and Rubin p-value 0.212
Notes: Panel A shows the first stage regressions, Panel B the main log Housing value 2SLS regressions. Additional housing
variables and the additional regressors (“Other Xs”) are the same as in Table 4. The Potential Innate Interactions are based on
Southern regions.
The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for F tests on single endogenous regressor are: 16.38 (10% maximal IV size), 8.96
(15%), 6.66 (20%) and 5.53 (25%). Clustered (by surname) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Two-stage Regressions With Stronger First Stages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arrested gangsters only
√
U.S. born gangsters only
√
Panel A: First stage regression log Closeness
Potential innate interactions (in %) 0.033** 0.036** 0.027
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018)
Zero potential innate interactions -0.019 -0.028 -0.024
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020)
PII using whole Italy 0.023**
(0.011)
Zero PII in whole Italy 0.000
(0.000)
R-squared 0.160 0.163 0.155 0.177
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 3.479 4.328 2.670 2.234
F-stat on potential innate interactions 5.208 6.540 4.899 2.394
Panel B: Main regression log Housing value
log Closeness 6.350** 7.103** 8.343** 8.784**
(3.196) (3.223) (4.144) (4.344)
Observations 641 554 641 429
Endogeneity p-value 0.212 0.0838 0.168 0.115
p value on PII 0.257 0.0657 0.111 0.0908
Anderson and Rubin p-value 0.212 0.0838 0.168 0.115
Notes: All regressions control for the additional housing variables and the additional
regressors as in Table 4. The Southern regions are Puglia, Campania, Calabria, Molise, and
Sicilia. The Potential Innate Interactions are based on Southern regions. Clustered (by
surname) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Robustness Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Panel A: First stage regression log Closeness
Potential innate interactions (in %) 0.032*** 0.033** 0.036** 0.032*** 0.027** 0.040 0.034**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.039) (0.015)
Zero potential innate interactions -0.019 -0.016 -0.012 -0.011 -0.020 -0.017





R-squared 0.224 0.178 0.238 0.228 0.306 0.155 0.165
F-stat on potential innate interactions 7.531 4.950 6.084 6.693 4.165 1.009 5.413
Panel B: Main regression log Housing value
log Closeness 6.370** 6.175* 6.004* 7.294** 6.893* 5.085* 2.486*** 6.274**
(3.231) (3.326) (3.108) (3.695) (3.701) (3.010) (0.453) (3.174)
Fraction of Sicilian associates -0.634
(0.393)
Fraction of Italian associates -0.049
(0.443)
Connected wife 0.139 -0.022
(0.143) (0.228)
Average log housing value (MSA)
√




5 modus operandi dummies
√
12 crime convictions dummies
√
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 4.685 3.118 3.664 3.910 2.829 8.331 3.527
Endogeneity p-value 0.205 0.355 0.405 0.255 0.309 0.196 0.302
Anderson and Rubin p-value 0.149 0.257 0.196 0.151 0.227 0.0156 0.212
p-value on additional dummies 0.229 0.0322 0.590
Notes: The additional controls are the same as in the last columns of Table 4. Column 4 is based on
the subset of mobsters born in the United States, all the other regressions use the entire sample.
Additional coefficients are shown in appendix Tables ?? and ??. The Potential Innate Interactions are
based on Southern regions. Clustered (by 530 surnames) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A. Appendix: A Short History of the Mafia
and The American Mafia
This section is a brief history of the so-called “made” men of came to the United States,
and a description of how the Mafia operated in the 1960s when the FBN was filing the
800 records.
There is evidence of Mafia style organisations (Camorra in Campania, ’Ndrangheta
in Calabria, and Mafia in Sicily) operating on Italian post-unification (1861) territory.59
The collapse of Southern feudal institutions when the Northern troops conquered their
territories led to a sudden lack of law enforcement, and with a rising demand for pro-
tection local bandits started offering such services (Gambetta, 1996). The additional
ingredient that might have contributed to the emergence of the Mafia is what Banfield
(1967) described as a self-interested, family centric society which sacrificed the public
good, or social capital. Lack of social capital has probably prevented an early eradication
of the Mafia in Southern Italy.60
This means that the land that Southern Italian migrants were leaving behind some
50 years later was already in the hands of the Mafia. Historians define two major waves
of immigration from Sicily, before and after World War I (WWI). Before WWI immi-
grants were mainly driven by economic needs. Several Mafia bosses, like Lucky Luciano,
Tommaso Lucchese, Vito Genovese, Frank Costello, etc, were children of these early im-
migrants. Even though between 1901 and 1913 almost a quarter of Sicily’s population
departed for America, many of the early immigrant families were not from Sicily. In
that period around two million Italians, mainly from the South emigrated to the US
59See Buonanno et al. (forthcoming).
60Putnam et al. (1994) documents large differences in Social Capital between Southern and Northern
Italy and Pinotti (forthcoming) shows not only that the Mafia is expanding to other Southern regions,
but also that the cost of such expansions are large in terms of lost economic growth.
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(Critchley, 2009). These baby immigrants later became street gang members in the
slums; they spoke little Italian, and worked side by side with criminals from other ethnic-
ities, mainly Jewish and Irish (Lupo, 2009). Lured by the criminal successes of the first
wave of immigrants, and (paradoxically) facilitated by prohibitionism, the second wave of
immigrants that went on to become Mafia bosses were already criminals by the time they
entered the United States. Charles Gambino, Joe Profaci, Joe Bonanno, and others were
in their 20s and 30s when they first entered the US (the average age in 1960 of Italian
born gangsters is indeed 6 years higher (54 years) than for American born ones), and
they all came from Sicily. Another reason for this selection of immigrants was the fascist
crack-down of the Mafia, which forced some of these criminals to leave Sicily. After the
second wave of immigration the Mafia became more closely linked to the Sicilian Mafia
and started adopting its code of honour and tradition.61
In 1930 and 1931 these new arrivals led to a Mafia war, called the Castellamare war,
named after a small city in Sicily where many of the new Mafia bosses came from. The war
lasted until Maranzano, who was trying to become the “Boss of the Bosses,” was killed,
probably by Lucky Luciano who had joined the Masseria Family.62 This war put Lucky
Luciano at the top of the Mafia organisation but also led to a reaction by the media and
the prosecutors.63 Between 1950 and 1951, the Kefauver Committee, officially the Senate
Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce, had a profound impact
on the American public. It was the first committee set up to gain a better understanding
of how to fight organized crime, and the main source of information was a list of 800
suspected criminals submitted by FBN’s Commissioner Anslinger, most likely an early
61See Gosch and Hammer (1975).
62Before this event, in order to end the power-struggle between Masseria and Maranzano, Lucky
Luciano had offered to eliminate Joe “the Boss” Masseria, which he did at an Italian restaurant by
poisoning Masseria’s food with lead.
63In 1936 Thomas E. Dewey, appointed as New York City special prosecutor to crack down on the
rackets, managed to obtain Luciano’s conviction with charges on multiple counts of forced prostitution.
Luciano served only 10 of the 30 to 50 years sentenced. In 1946 thanks to an alleged involvement in the
Allied troops’ landing in Sicily he was deported to Italy, from where he tried to keep organising “the
organisation.”
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version of the records used in this paper (McWilliams, 1990, pg. 141).64
Throughout the 1950s the FBN continued to investigate the Mafia, and in 1957,
an unexpected raid of an American Mafia summit, the “Apalachin meeting,” captured
considerable media attention. Police detained over 60 underworld bosses from the raid.
After that meeting everyone had to agree with the FBN’s view that there was one large
and well organized Mafia society. Robert Kennedy, attorney general of the United States,
and J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, joined Harry J.
Anslinger, the US Commissioner of Narcotics, in his war against the mob. The same
years a permanent Senate Select Committee was formed – the McClellan commission.
Anslinger’s FBN conducted the investigative work and coordinated nationwide arrests of
Apalachin defendants. Lucky Luciano died of a heart attack at the airport of Naples in
1962.
64The Committee could not prove the existence of a Mafia and after Luciano’s expatriation several
other Families headed the organisation: Costello, Profaci, Bonanno, and Gambino. Family ties were of
utmost importance. According to Bonanno’s autobiography (Bonanno, 1983), he became the Boss of the
Bosses in part by organising the marriage between his son Bill and the daughter of Profaci, Rosalia in
1956. In 1957 Gambino took over the leadership.
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B. Online Appendix Figures
Fig. 9: Surveillance Pictures of Nick Giso in 1980, and Sammy Gravano in 1988
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Fig. 11: Correlation at the Zip Code-level Between Log-Median Housing Prices and Log-
Median Income
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Fig. 12: Auto-correlation of Zip-level Median Prices between 1997 and 2013
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log Betweenness
Fig. 13: Densities of Log Centrality Indices
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Fig. 14: Relationship Between Log-centrality Indices
Notes: The density shown excludes the top 1 percent of the distribution.
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C. Online Appendix Tables
Table 9: Testing for Heteroscedasticity: Squared Residual Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Squared residuals (× 100)
Closeness Eigenvector Degree Betweenness
OLS NLLS OLS NLLS OLS NLLS OLS NLLS
Average distance -1.10% -0.01% -0.78% -0.01% -0.06% 0.00% 0.35% 0.00%
(0.023) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000)
Constant 132.1* 4.870*** 123.7* 4.801*** 108.3 4.683*** 97.80 4.596***
(62.569) (0.618) (63.007) (0.618) (65.183) (0.611) (65.587) (0.609)
Observations 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 641
Notes: The residuals are based on Column 3 in Table 4 and Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 5.
The non-linear least squares regressions (NLLS) model the squared residual as an exponential
function of distance. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10: Place of Birth Heterogeneity
(1) (2)
log Housing value
log Closeness 0.683 1.375
(0.880) (0.894)
× born outside Italy 1.079 0.872
(0.985) (0.975)





Notes: All regressions control for the housing
variables. The additional regressors (“Other
Xs”) are the same as in Table 4. Clustered
(by 530 surnames) standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11: Housing Value Regressions Without Weighting for the Sampling Design
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log Housing value
log Closeness 1.504*** 2.299***
(0.328) (0.403)
log Eigenvector 0.152*** 0.212***
(0.034) (0.040)
log Degree 0.042 0.136**
(0.054) (0.067)
log Betweenness -0.049 0.039
(0.070) (0.092)
Other regressors X X X X
Observations 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 641
R-squared 0.046 0.132 0.046 0.128 0.020 0.093 0.020 0.087
Notes: All regressions control for the housing variables. The additional regressors (“Other Xs”) are the
same as in Table 4. Clustered (by 530 surnames) standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Full First Stage Regressions: Centrality Measures and the
Potential Innate Interactions Based on Surnames
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log Closeness log Eigenvector log Degree log Betweennes
Potential innate interactions (in %) 0.033** 0.268* 0.116 0.138***
(0.015) (0.158) (0.094) (0.053)
Zero potential innate interactions -0.019 -0.308 -0.236 0.011
(0.020) (0.234) (0.153) (0.032)
Housing built after 1960 -0.033* -0.416** -0.279** -0.056**
(0.019) (0.202) (0.123) (0.025)
Year built unknown -0.023 -0.162 -0.074 -0.032
(0.022) (0.232) (0.146) (0.032)
Extended family members 0.031** 0.256* 0.292*** 0.197***
(0.014) (0.148) (0.087) (0.032)
Born outside Italy (mainly U.S.) -0.004 -0.032 0.013 -0.018
(0.032) (0.359) (0.192) (0.036)
Born in Sicily 0.019 0.244 0.079 0.041
(0.031) (0.346) (0.199) (0.039)
Age 0.006 0.043 0.004 0.013
(0.009) (0.103) (0.059) (0.017)
Age squared/100 -0.005 -0.033 0.003 -0.011
(0.010) (0.108) (0.062) (0.018)
Year of birth unknown 0.149 0.793 0.331 0.390
(0.210) (2.374) (1.358) (0.386)
Height in feet 0.070* 0.830* 0.275 0.042
(0.037) (0.425) (0.214) (0.058)
Weight in pounds -0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
Age at first arrest -0.001 -0.016 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.001)
Never arrested -0.051 -0.629* -0.080 0.020
(0.031) (0.350) (0.175) (0.043)
Married 0.014 0.166 0.181 0.006
(0.018) (0.201) (0.128) (0.029)
Divorced -0.027 -0.374 -0.180 0.007
(0.029) (0.338) (0.217) (0.046)
Number of children 0.001 -0.008 -0.041 0.004
(0.006) (0.061) (0.033) (0.007)
Siblings 0.005 0.044 0.030 0.009*
(0.003) (0.034) (0.020) (0.005)
Types of crime committed -0.010* -0.092 -0.029 -0.003
(0.006) (0.062) (0.037) (0.007)
Number of businesses 0.010* 0.118* 0.061* 0.024**
(0.006) (0.061) (0.033) (0.010)
Involved in drug dealing -0.003 -0.121 -0.075 0.033
(0.015) (0.167) (0.105) (0.024)
Housing variables
Observations 641 641 641 641
R-squared 0.160 0.146 0.205 0.326
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 3.479 2.663 2.343 12.60
F-stat on potential innate interactions 5.208 2.887 1.523 6.726
Notes: All regressions control for the housing variables. The additional regressors
(“Other Xs”) are the same as in Table 4. Clustered (by 530 surnames) standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13: Full IV Regressions: Centrality Measures
and the Potential Innate Interactions Based on Sur-
names










Housing built after 1960 0.178 0.227 0.238 0.036
(0.193) (0.219) (0.232) (0.179)
Year built unknown -0.193 -0.243 -0.276* -0.292**
(0.174) (0.171) (0.162) (0.136)
Extended family members -0.366** -0.323*** -0.439** -0.387
(0.144) (0.124) (0.189) (0.277)
Born outside Italy (mainly U.S.) -0.056 -0.050 -0.077 -0.085
(0.225) (0.239) (0.222) (0.184)
Born in Sicily -0.349 -0.381 -0.305 -0.276
(0.244) (0.264) (0.246) (0.200)
Age -0.089 -0.077 -0.054 -0.063
(0.079) (0.079) (0.083) (0.082)
Age squared/100 0.086 0.076 0.054 0.066
(0.086) (0.088) (0.091) (0.088)
Year of birth unknown -2.327 -1.900 -1.739 -1.822
(1.725) (1.685) (1.822) (1.829)
Height in feet 0.265 0.203 0.462 0.646**
(0.388) (0.445) (0.383) (0.320)
Weight in pounds -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Age at first arrest -0.008 -0.007 -0.017** -0.016**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Never arrested 0.051 0.125 -0.187 -0.285
(0.254) (0.278) (0.230) (0.232)
Married -0.111 -0.131 -0.210 -0.046
(0.172) (0.183) (0.208) (0.152)
Divorced 0.101 0.172 0.113 -0.119
(0.287) (0.325) (0.347) (0.233)
Number of children -0.032 -0.023 0.012 -0.032
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.032)
Siblings -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.017
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037) (0.028)
Types of crime committed 0.057 0.048 0.020 -0.002
(0.052) (0.049) (0.046) (0.040)
Number of businesses 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.038
(0.063) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062)
Involved in drug dealing 0.361*** 0.421*** 0.419*** 0.297***
(0.110) (0.118) (0.127) (0.110)
Observations 641 641 641 641
Notes: The additional housing variables are the same as in
Table 4. Clustered (by 530 surnames) standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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